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Abstract 
People’s risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based 
on information learned through experience. For decisions from description, people are typically 
more risk averse for gains than losses. In contrast, for decisions from experience, people are 
sometimes more risk seeking for gains than losses, especially for choices with the possibility of 
extreme outcomes (big wins or big losses), which are systematically overweighed in memory. 
Using a within-subject design, this study evaluated whether this memory bias plays a role in the 
differences in risky choice between description and experience. As in previous studies, people 
were more risk seeking for losses than for gains in description but showed the opposite pattern in 
experience. People also more readily remembered the extreme outcomes and judged them as 
having occurred more frequently. These memory biases correlated with risk preferences in 
decisions from experience but not in decisions from description. These results suggest that 
systematic memory biases may be responsible for some of the differences in risk preference 
across description and experience.  
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Introduction 
Risk preferences often differ depending on whether people make choices based on described 
probabilities versus direct experience of the odds and outcomes. These differences have most 
often been shown in studies of risky choice involving rare events (e.g., Barron et al., 2003; 
Hertwig et al., 2004), but are also sometimes present when the risky outcomes occur with equal 
probabilities (e.g., Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). Here, we evaluate to what degree risky choices in 
description and experience are driven by independent processes. In particular, we evaluate the 
role of memory biases in risky choice in these two domains. 
 When people make decisions from described probabilities, they tend to be more risk 
averse for gains than losses (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, given a choice 
between a guaranteed win of $20 or a 50% chance of winning $40, most people choose the 
guaranteed win. In contrast, when faced with a choice between a guaranteed loss of $20 or a 50% 
chance of losing $40, most people choose the gamble. This pattern of results (risk aversion for 
gains; risk seeking for losses) is known as the reflection effect.  
When people make decisions from experienced outcomes, however, they sometimes 
show a reversal of this reflection effect and are more risk seeking for gains than losses (e.g., 
Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). In decisions from experience, participants are often presented with two 
options and make repeated choices (i.e., a partial-feedback design; see Hertwig & Erev, 2009). 
The odds and outcomes of these options are initially unknown, but feedback is provided for the 
chosen option. As participants continue to make choices, they accumulate information about the 
outcomes of the options and can make subsequent choices based on these learned experiences. 
This design contrasts with the sampling procedure, where participants first learn about the 
outcomes from each option by sampling and then make a single consequential choice (e.g., 
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Camilleri & Newell, 2011; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In previous work with such a partial-
feedback design, we showed that when these experienced risky options potentially lead to an 
extreme, but common, outcome (i.e., the highest and lowest outcomes in a context), people are 
more risk seeking for gains than for losses—the opposite of the usual reflection effect in 
description (e.g., Ludvig et al., 2014a). Moreover, the degree of risk preference in both the gain 
and loss domains for these decisions from experience correlates with inter-individual differences 
in the memory for the extreme outcomes (Madan et al., 2014).  
Most demonstrations that people behave differently in decisions from description and 
experience have used between-subject designs (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Camilleri & Newell, 
2011; Hertwig et al., 2004). These designs limit the evaluation of what factors differentially 
affect risk preference in description and experience within individuals. The few studies to date 
that have tested the same individuals with both types of decisions found similar patterns to the 
between-subject designs (Camilleri & Newell, 2009; Kudryavtsev & Pavlodsky, 2012; Ludvig & 
Spetch, 2011). For example, Camilleri and Newell (2009) observed a description-experience gap 
within subjects using a set of ten problems, each with different odds and outcomes. Similarly, 
without any rare events, Ludvig and Spetch (2011) found that people exhibited a clear 
description-experience gap, despite repeatedly encountering the exact same gambles in the 
different information formats. In that experiment, in both description and experience, the risky 
options consisted of 50/50 gambles between the same outcome values. Such differences due to 
information format are not limited to humans: individual monkeys have also been shown to 
exhibit differences in risk preference between described and experienced conditions (Heilbronner 
& Hayden, in press). 
Why does this difference in risk preference emerge between description and experience 
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even within individuals? Hertwig and Erev (2009) suggested several possible reasons why 
experience and description might differ, including sampling error, recency effects, and 
estimation error. Other recent studies have investigated how different aspects of memory 
influence decisions from experience (e.g., Frey et al., 2015; Gibson & Zielaskowski, 2013; 
Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Ludvig et al., 2015; Madan et al., 2014; Plonsky et al., 2015; Rakow et 
al., 2008). For example, outcome recency generally impacts choice in decisions from experience, 
with more recent outcomes influencing choice more strongly (e.g., Frey et al., 2015; Hertwig et 
al., 2004; Madan et al., 2014; Rakow et al., 2008; but see Abdellaouai, 2011). Working memory 
capacity, however, seems to have little influence on decisions from experience in the sampling 
protocol (e.g., Frey et al., 2015; Wulff et al., 2015a, 2015b). Here we focus on the potential role 
of a specific memory bias: a bias toward remembering the extreme outcomes (highest and lowest 
in a context). These extreme outcomes are overweighted in memory and this overweighting 
correlated with risk preference in decisions from experience (e.g., Madan et al., 2014). These 
results suggest that some of the observed differences in risky choice between description and 
experience might be due to this memory bias.  
Memory also likely plays a significant role in decisions from description. Many 
prominent theories of choice behavior in decisions from description contain mechanisms related 
to memory sampling, such as the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974), the 
decision-by-sampling framework (Stewart et al., 2006), and query theory (Johnson et al., 2007). 
Thus, one possibility is that a common underlying process—such as one related to an effect of 
extreme outcomes on valuation, probability estimation, or attentional capture—may influence 
both memory and choice in both decisions from description and experience. For example, in a 
series of studies, Yechiam and Hochman (2013) found that an attentional bias for loss outcomes 
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influenced both decisions from description and experience. Similarly, some people may 
generally be relatively more attentive to extreme outcomes, and thus both remember them better 
and weight them more heavily in decision making across both domains. As a result, a memory 
bias observed in decisions from experience may also appear in decisions from description. If 
instead this memory bias is specific to decisions from experience and is not caused by a common 
underlying process, then it should not correlate with risk preference in decisions from 
description. 
Here, we used a large-scale within-subject design, testing both decisions from description 
and experience in the same subjects, where the risky outcomes occurred equiprobably (as in 
Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). A partial-feedback procedure was used for the decisions from 
experience, where participants received feedback after each choice for the selected option. After 
the risky decision-making task, memory tests were administered to evaluate participants’ ability 
to access information about the risky outcomes in decisions from experience, as well as their 
ability to estimate the frequency at which each outcome occurred (as in Madan et al., 2014).  
We hypothesized that these memories for extreme outcomes might be one of the ways 
that decisions from experience and description differ from one another. Specifically, we 
predicted that people would show a memory bias in which the extreme outcomes would be more 
accessible in memory and their frequency would be over-estimated relative to the equiprobable 
non-extreme outcomes, as has been found in our previous work (e.g., Madan et al, 2014). 
Importantly, for decisions from experience, we also predicted that a memory bias for the extreme 
gain outcome (i.e., for the best possible outcome in the decision context) would correlate 
positively with selection of the risky option on gain decisions and that a memory bias for the 
extreme loss outcome (worst possible outcome) would correlate negatively with selection of the 
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risky option on loss decisions. That is, any bias toward over-remembering the best outcome 
would make the risky option on gain choices more attractive and a bias toward over-
remembering the worst outcome would make the risky option on loss choices less attractive. 
Memory was therefore separately tested for the risky gain and the risky loss, and these analyses 
were conducted separately in the gain and loss domains. Correlations between these memory 
measures and experience, but not description, would thus provide evidence for the unique 
importance of memory processes in decisions from experience.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 256 participants (146 females; age [M±SD] = 19.3±2.6) were drawn from the 
University of Alberta psychology participant pool, and informed consent was obtained. 
Participants received course credit and a cash bonus for participating. Sample size was 
determined based on Schönbrodt and Perugini (2013), who demonstrated that, for typical 
psychological variables, correlations stabilize at N=250. Participants were tested individually in 
enclosed rooms, but were recruited and briefed of the instructions in groups of up to 15. 
Procedures were approved by the University of Alberta Human Research Ethics Board. 
Data for risk-related personality traits were also collected in a preceding online session 
that included questionnaires from a number of psychology laboratories at the University of 
Alberta; analyses incorporating those questionnaires are not reported here.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of five blocks of trials that alternated between two blocks with 
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decisions from description and three blocks with decisions from experience. The extra block of 
decisions from experience was included because past research indicated that decisions from 
description remain relatively stable across blocks, whereas preferences develop over training for 
decisions from experience as the outcomes associated with each option are learned (Ludvig & 
Spetch, 2011; Ludvig et al., 2014a).  
 
Decisions from description. On each trial, people chose between pairs of described options, 
which were selected from four possible options: a fixed gain (+20), risky gain (0 or +40, 50% 
chance of either), fixed loss (−20), and risky loss (0 or −40, 50% chance of either; see Fig. 1A). 
Fixed options were displayed as text (e.g., “Win 20 points”), and risky options were displayed as 
pie charts. After a choice, the options disappeared, but no feedback was given.  
Each block consisted of 52 trials and included a mixture of trial types: There were 32 
decision trials which required a choice between either the two gain options or the two loss 
options (16 of each). In both cases, the fixed option always led to the same outcome (+20 or 
−20), and the risky option led with a 50/50 chance to double the fixed outcome (+40 or −40) or 
nothing (0). There were 20 catch trials, which pitted a gain versus a loss or offered a choice 
between two gains or losses of different objective values (e.g., “Win 10 points” vs. “Win 20 
points”, or a pie chart depicting a 75% chance of losing −40 points vs. “Lose 20 points”). These 
catch trials were designed to ensure that participants were engaged in the task.  
 
Decisions from experience. On most trials, people chose between pairs of doors, which were 
selected from four possible doors which led to either a fixed gain (+20), a risky gain (0 or +40, 
50% chance of either), a fixed loss (−20), or a risky loss (0 or −40, 50% chance of either; see  
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Figure 1. Example of decision trials. A. Decisions from description involved choices between 
described outcomes and probabilities. B. Decisions from experience involved choices between 
two gain or two loss doors. One door always led to a gain (or loss) of a fixed number of points, 
and the other door led equiprobably to one of 2 possible outcomes. Choices were followed by 
feedback about the amount gained (or lost).  
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Fig. 1B). Participants could only learn about the odds and outcomes by selecting the doors. After 
a choice, the doors disappeared, and feedback appeared for 1.2 s for the chosen option. Feedback 
consisted of the points earned or lost along with an image of a pot of gold or robber, for gain and 
loss doors, respectively. Assignment of doors to particular outcomes was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Each experience block consisted of 56 trials and included a mixture of trial types: There 
were 32 decision trials, which required a choice between either the two gain doors or the two 
loss doors (16 of each). The fixed doors always led to the same outcome (+20 or −20), and the 
risky doors led with a 50/50 chance to double the fixed outcome (+40 or −40) or nothing (0). 
There were 16 catch trials, which required a choice between a gain door and a loss door. On 8 
single-door trials, there was only one door, which had to be selected to continue. These trials 
guaranteed that all reward contingencies were experienced, even if the doors were initially 
unlucky, thereby limiting any hot-stove effects (Denrell & March, 2001).  
Prior to the first block, participants were presented with 24 single-door trials to provide 
experience with the experimental procedure. For these trials, the outcomes associated with the 
risky doors occurred equally often, further preventing differences in initial experiences from 
influencing risk preferences (e.g., hot-stove or primacy effects). Within this block, each gain 
door appeared 8 times and each loss door appeared 4 times, such that participants ended the 
block with a positive number of points. 
In all blocks, trial order was randomized. Each door/option appeared equally often on 
either side of the screen. Performance of lower than 60% on catch trials in either decisions from 
description or experience across the whole experiment was used as an exclusion criterion, 
following established protocol from previous experiments (Ludvig et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015; 
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Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Madan et al., 2014, 2015). Data from 18 of the 256 participants were 
thus excluded. Participants won or lost points on all trials and were paid $1 for every 300 points 
to a maximum of $5.  
 
Memory tests. After the choice task, participants’ memory for the outcomes associated with 
each door was tested in two ways. First, participants were shown the four doors in random order 
and asked to report for each the first outcome that came to mind. Second, participants were again 
shown the four doors in random order and asked to judge the frequency in percent of each of the 
possible outcomes (−40, −20, 0, +20, +40). For each door, these 5 possible outcomes were 
displayed simultaneously, and participants typed a number from 0 to 100 below each outcome. 
 
Results 
Risk Preferences 
Figure 2A plots the mean proportion of risky choices in the final described and experienced 
blocks. Participants showed the usual reflection effect in description (more risk seeking for 
losses than gains), but a reversed reflection effect in experience (more risk seeking for gains than 
losses). These differences were corroborated through a 2×2 repeated-measures ANOVA with 
decision type (description, experience) and outcome type (gain, loss) as factors. There was an 
interaction of decision type and outcome type [F(1,237)=34.93, p<.001, ηp2=.13], but no main 
effects [decision type: F(1,237)=0.37, p=.55, ηp2=.002; outcome type: F(1,237)=0.37, p=.82, 
ηp2<.001]. In decisions from description, participants were 8.7±5.5% (M±95% CI) more risk 
seeking for losses than gains [t(237)=3.10, p=.002, Cohen’s d=0.23]. In contrast, in decisions  
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Figure 2. Risk preference results. A-B. Mean risk preference (± SEM) for gain and loss 
decision trials for both description and experience blocks, for the last 2 blocks of decisions 
(panel A) and across all blocks (panel B). C-E. Scatterplot of individual risk preferences for 
decisions from description and experience across participants, for overall risk preference (panel 
C), only gains (panel D), and only losses (panel E). Each dot represents a participant; dot 
locations are jittered to reduce overlap. 
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from experience, participants were 9.7±5.2% more risk seeking for gains than losses 
[t(237)=3.69, p<.001, d=0.29].  
As intended, this result replicates the central finding from Ludvig and Spetch (2011). 
Similar results were found when only looking at choices on the first decision from description 
(see Appendix). We additionally examined risk preferences across blocks for both types of 
decisions as shown in Figure 2B. Individual risk preferences were consistent across the blocks—
participants who demonstrated a large reflection effect in one block also did so in the other block 
of the same decision type (i.e., test-retest reliability) [description (blocks 2-4): r(236)=.69, 
p<.001; experience (blocks 3-5): r(236)=.67, p<.001].  
Next, we tested the relationship between risk preferences in decisions from description 
and experience. First we examined the overall levels of risk preference (collapsed across gains 
and losses) for the two decision types. This analysis tested whether someone who was more risk 
seeking in description was also more risk seeking in experience. Figure 2C shows how there was 
a strong positive correlation between overall risk preferences for the two decision types 
[r(236)=.51, p<.001].  
We further parsed these results by running separate correlations for gains and losses. As 
shown in Figure 2D, people who were more risk seeking for gains in description were also more 
risk seeking for gains in experience [r(236)=.44, p<.001]; Figure 2E shows that this relationship 
also held for losses [r(236)=.47, p<.001]. As is apparent in Figures 2D-E, there was an overall 
shift in risk preference between gains and losses (i.e., the y-intercepts), but the relationship 
across individuals between risk preferences in description and experience was similar (i.e., the 
slopes). 
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Risk Preference and Memory  
Next we examined performance on the memory tasks (first outcome and frequency judgment) 
and the correlations with risk preferences. To control for variability in the actual outcomes 
experienced, partial correlations were also calculated and reported; these measure the 
relationship between risk preference and memory independent of any effect of the actual 
outcomes experienced (see Madan et al., 2014). The partial correlations reported also controlled 
for risk preference in the other type of decision (description, experience) of the same outcome 
type (gain, loss). This refinement allows assessment of the relationship between memory and risk 
preference specifically in one type of decision, rather than more general risk preferences. All 
analyses were separately conducted for gains and losses as the memory tests queried gains and 
losses separately. 
 
First outcome. Figure 3A shows how, when asked the first outcome to come to mind for the 
risky door, more people reported the extreme outcome (+40 or −40) than the zero outcome for 
both gains [χ2(1,N=187)=36.78, p<.001] and losses [χ2(1,N=181)=68.07, p<.001].   
 Figure 3B plots risk preference in the last block of experience based on responses to this 
first-outcome question. For gains, people who reported +40 were 37.4±9.6% more risk seeking 
than those who reported 0 [t(185)=7.70, p<.001, d=1.24], even after controlling for outcomes 
experienced and risk preference in description [rp(183)=.40, p<.001], and for losses, people who 
reported −40 were 28.8±10.4% less risk seeking than those who reported 0 [t(179)=5.30, p<.001, 
d=1.00; rp(177)=−.29, p<.001]. Figure 3C plots risk preference in the last block of description 
based on participants’ first outcome reported. For both gains and losses, there were consistent, 
but weaker, relationships between the first-outcome question and risk preference in description  
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Figure 3. Results from the memory tests. A. Proportion of participants who responded with 
±40, 0, or neither in the first-outcome questions. B. Mean risk preference (±SEM) for gains and 
losses in the last block of experience trials, split on the basis of what the participant reported to 
the first-outcome question. C. Mean risk preference (±SEM) for gains and losses in the last block 
of description trials, split on the basis of what the participant reported to the first-outcome 
question. D. Mean judged percent (±SEM) for the ±40 and 0 outcomes from the frequency 
judgment question. For simplicity, all other values were coded as “Other.” E. Scatterplot of risk 
preference in the last block of experience trials and frequency judgment responses for the gain 
and loss doors. F. Scatterplot of risk preference in the last block of description trials and 
frequency judgment responses for the gain and loss doors. Note that the frequency judgments are 
for the stimuli from the experience trials, but the risk preference are from the description trials. 
For the scatterplots, each dot represents an individual participant; dot locations are jittered to 
reduce overlap. 
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[gains: t(185)=2.85, p=.005, d=0.45; losses: t(179)=2.76, p=.006, d=0.52]. These effects, 
however, were eliminated with the partial correlations that controlled for risk preference in 
experience [gains: rp(183)=−.02, p=.75; losses: rp(177)=−.05, p=.49].  
 Next, we more specifically tested for a relationship between memory and the difference 
in risk preference between the two decision types (i.e., the description-experience gap), 
separately for gains and losses. As this measure is based on differences between risk preferences 
in decisions from description vs. experience, it is not affected by inter-individual differences in 
overall risk preference. For gains, participants who reported +40 had a 20.8±11.7% larger 
description-experience gap than those who reported 0 [t(185)=3.51, p<.001, d=0.56; rp(184)=.21, 
p=.004]. For losses, participants who reported −40 had a 9.4±13.8% larger description-
experience gap; however, this difference was not significant [t(179)=1.35, p=.18, d=0.25; 
rp(178)=−.08, p=.30]. 
 
Frequency judgments. Ten additional participants with total frequencies above 150% were 
excluded from this analysis.  
 Figure 3D shows frequency judgments for the risky doors. On gain trials, participants 
judged the +40 outcomes as occurring only 2.4±4.1% more frequently than the 0 outcome 
[t(227)=1.13, p=.26, d=0.12]. On loss trials, however, participants judged the −40 outcome as 
having occurred 20.4±4.7% more frequently than the 0 outcome [t(227)=8.59, p<.001, d=0.97]. 
Figure 3E plots risk preference in the last block of experience trials against frequency 
judgments for the extreme outcomes (+40 or −40). For gains, risk seeking increased with the 
judged frequencies of +40 [r(226)=.26, p<.001], whereas for losses, risk seeking decreased with 
the judged frequency of −40 [r(226)= −.39, p<.001]. When controlling for outcomes experienced 
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and risk preferences in description, both effects persisted [gains: rp(224)=.26, p<.001; losses: 
rp(224)=−.35, p<.001]. Figure 3F plots risk preference in the last block of description trials 
against frequency judgments for the extreme outcomes (+40 or −40). Risk preference in 
description was not directly correlated with judged frequency of the experience outcomes [gains: 
r(226)=−.02, p=.79; losses: r(226)= −.08, p=.21]. When controlling for outcomes experienced 
and risk preference in experience, the partial correlations were small in magnitude [gains: 
rp(224)=−.16, p=.014; losses: rp(224)=.12, p=.077], and in the opposite direction as the 
correlations with risk preference in experience (and the plotted lines in Fig. 3F).  
The observed description-experience gap also correlated with the judged frequency of the 
experienced outcomes for risky gains [r(226)=−.26, p<.001; rp(224)=−.16, p=.014]. For risky 
losses, while the relationship was initially statistically significant, the correlation was no longer 
significant after accounting for inter-individual differences in the outcomes experienced 
[r(226)=.26, p<.001; rp(224)=.059, p=.38]. Thus, memory responses for the risky gain door using 
both first-outcome reported and frequency judgment correlated reliably with the description-
experience gap, but neither memory measure for the risky loss door was reliably related to the 
size of the description-experience gap.  
 
Correspondence Between Memory Tasks 
Both memory tasks aim to measure memory for the outcomes from the risky doors, but it is 
unknown how closely these two measures correspond. We therefore examined whether 
differences in the first outcome provided led to different frequency judgments for the respective 
extreme outcome. For gains, participants who reported +40 provided a 12.3±5.8% higher 
frequency judgment for +40 [t(177)=4.19, p<.001, d=0.69; rp(176)= .24, p<.001]. For losses, 
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there was also a correspondence between frequency judgments and first-outcome reported. 
People who reported −40 provided a 14.8±7.3% higher frequency judgment for −40 
[t(173)=4.01, p<.001, d=0.76; rp(172)= −.25, p<.001]. 
As can be observed from Figure 3E, many participants reported the veridical exact 
frequency of the outcomes for the risky doors (50/50). Out of the 228 participants who were 
included in the frequency judgment analyses, 140 (61.4%) correctly reported 50/50 odds for 
gains, and 124 (54.4%) did so for losses; 103 participants (45.2%) correctly reported 50/50 odds 
for both gains and losses. Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 4A, these participants also showed the 
same memory biases in the first-outcome question: For gains, 27/140 participants reported 0, and 
79 participants reported +40 as the first outcome [χ2(1,N=106)=25.51, p<.001] (34 participants 
reported neither); for losses, 81/124 participants reported −40, and 13 participants reported 0 
[χ2(1,N=94)=49.19, p<.001] (30 participants reported neither).  
These individuals also showed the same difference in risk preference between description 
and experience as the full sample. Figure 4B plots the risk preferences for the sub-sample of 103 
participants that correctly reported 50/50 for both gains and losses. These participants still 
demonstrated the usual reflection effect in description and reversed reflection effect in 
experience. Again, these differences were corroborated through a 2×2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA with decision type and outcome type as factors. There was an interaction of decision 
type and outcome type [F(1,102)=14.83, p<.001, ηp2=.13], but no main effects [decision type: 
F(1,102)=2.26, p=.14, ηp2=.02; outcome type: F(1,102)=0.08, p=.78, ηp2<.001], confirming a 
significant description-experience gap. In decisions from description, participants were 7.2±8.9% 
more risk seeking for losses than gains, though this difference was not statistically significant 
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[t(102)=1.60, p=.11, d=0.19]. In decisions from experience, participants were 9.0±6.7% more 
risk seeking for gains than losses [t(102)=2.63, p=.010, d=0.27].  
 
 
Figure 4. Results for the participants who responded 50/50 in the frequency judgment 
question. A. Proportion of participants who responded with ±40, 0, or neither in the first-
outcome questions. B. Mean risk preference (± SEM) for gain and loss decision trials for both 
description and experience blocks, for the last 2 blocks of decisions.	
 
Discussion 
In this study, by analyzing individual differences in a within-subject design, we found that 
memory biases correlated with risk preferences in decisions from experience, but not description. 
The relationship between memory and decisions for experience supports a number of current 
theories, which suggest that the valuation of options is related to a memory sampling process, 
including the decision-by-sampling framework (Stewart et al., 2006), query theory (Johnson et 
al., 2007), instance-based learning (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011), and the drift-diffusion model 
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(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). The importance of memory in value-based decision-making is also 
supported by neuroimaging and patient studies (see Palombo et al., 2015, and Shohamy & Daw, 
2015, for recent reviews). Specifically, it has been found that the hippocampus, a brain region 
critical to the formation of integrated memory episodes, also plays an important role in a variety 
of decision-making tasks.  
Here, we present clear empirical evidence for this important role for memory in decision 
making, but with some boundary conditions. In the task, participants made decisions from both 
description and experience, yet inter-individual variability in memory biases were only related to 
decisions from experience. This divergence makes sense because the odds of each potential 
outcome are explicitly stated in decisions from description, whereas in decisions from 
experience, the odds of each outcome can only be assessed through memories of past 
experiences. 
Unlike most studies of the description-experience gap, which tend to focus on rare events 
(e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009), this study did not involve any rare events. All 
the risky options here (both described and experienced) led to one of two equiprobable 
outcomes, yet there was still a clear difference in risk preference. With all outcomes following 
the risky options occurring 50% of the time, concerns about an asymmetric sampling error 
potentially driving the gap (e.g., Fox & Hadar, 2006) are muted. In addition, this distribution of 
outcomes is already the maximum entropy distribution, so the differences between experience 
and description cannot be due to regression toward the mean (e.g., Glöckner et al., 2016). This 
point is especially notable amongst the subset of participants who correctly articulated the 50/50 
distribution for the risky options in experience, yet still showed a difference in risk preference 
between description and experience (see Figure 4B). The correlations with memory raises the 
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interesting possibility that other aspects of the description-experience gap, such as rare-event 
weighting, may also be partly determined by memory biases. Indeed, prior studies have 
suggested that a bias toward remembering recent outcomes does influence choice in sampling-
based protocols (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow et al., 2008; Wulff et al., 2015a; but see 
Abdellaoui et al., 2011).  
Our findings suggest that different processes underlie decisions from description and 
experience, which is convergent with results from recent modeling competitions (e.g., Erev et al., 
2010; see also Hau et al., 2008). In those competitions, different, non-overlapping models 
produced the best fits to decisions from description (modified prospect theory) and experience 
(small-sample, instance-based model). These competitions, like most of the literature, used 
aggregate data across different groups of individuals in description and experience. A similar 
distinction occurs with the DOSPERT risk-attitude questionnaire (Blais & Weber, 2006), where 
scores correlate with risk preference in decisions from description, but not decisions from 
experience (Camilleri & Newell, 2009).  
Another recent study examined individual differences in a series of 40 different decisions 
from description and 10 different decisions from experience (Kudryavtsev & Pavlodsky, 2012). 
They fit distinct valuation models to the data for decisions from description (prospect theory; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and experience (expectancy-valence model; Busemeyer & Stout, 
2002) and found that loss-weighting parameters were relatively consistent within individuals 
across the decision types. No other parameters, however, were reliably correlated between 
description and experience in their sample.  
In addition to distinct, memory-related differences between decisions from description 
and experience, we also found evidence of a common underlying process. People who were more 
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risk seeking in one decision type were generally more risk seeking in the other decision type. 
These commonalities were observed both in overall risk preference (Fig. 2C) and separately in 
risk preference for gains and losses (Figs. 2D-E). Moreover, this commonality occurred despite 
the presence of overall differences in risk preference between decisions. 
Less is known about the nature of these shared processes. Numerous processes could be 
common to decisions from description and experience, including loss weighting (Kudryavtsev & 
Pavlodsky, 2012), probability estimation, option valuation, risk sensitivity, and/or evidence 
accumulation. Further research is required to disentangle exactly which psychological processes 
underlie the shared component of risk preference across description and experience. Providing 
some direction, Kudryavtsev & Pavlodsky (2012) found that despite different models providing 
the best fits for decisions from description (prospect theory) and experience (expectancy-valence 
model), there was consistency in that loss weighting parameters were correlated between the two 
models across individuals, suggesting a shared process. A consistent loss weighting across 
description and experience, as found by Kudryavtsev and Pavlodsky (2012), could account for 
some but not all of the present results. In particular, there was a significant correlation even for 
choices that only involved gains (Fig. 2D). Thus, these findings suggest the commonalities 
between description and experience extend beyond loss weighting alone. 
The experimental procedure used here, however, potentially inflated the degree of 
commonality between decisions from description and experience. Specifically, the experiment 
was designed to minimize the procedural differences between the two types of decisions. For 
example, the same outcome values were used, and the two types of decisions were alternated in 
blocks. Thus, it is quite plausible that participants were more aware that they were making the 
same decisions in both domains. As such, participants may have attempted to be more consistent 
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in their risk preferences across decisions from description and experience. Indeed, the different 
patterns of risky choice that emerged for decisions from description and experience are all the 
more striking given these procedural commonalities.    
Because the experiment involved probing memory after the choice task was completed, 
we cannot conclude that the memory biases causally drive choice behavior in decisions from 
experience. In recent work, however, using a similar procedure, we found that presenting 
outcome-related cues prior to a decision can prime participants to make riskier choices (Ludvig 
et al., 2015). Priming effects on risky choice have also been demonstrated by others using varied 
procedures (e.g., Gibson & Zielaskowski, 2013; Erb et al., 2002; Newell & Shaw, in press), 
demonstrating that memory accessibility is related to choice behavior and can play a causal role.  
Many psychological mechanisms have been proposed to account for the gap between 
risky decisions from description and experience, but, thus far, there has been limited evidence for 
their operation. Here, we provide clear empirical evidence that a memory bias for extreme 
outcomes uniquely influences decisions from experiences, possibly driving one aspect of the 
description-experience gap. Future work will need to determine the involvement of memory 
processes in other aspects of the description-experience gap, such as the relative weighting of 
rare events, as well as the proximal mechanisms through which memories influence choice. 
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Appendix 
First Decision from Description 
In the task, participants made repeated decisions from description, rather than presenting 
multiple problems with only a single trial of each. This task made decisions from description 
procedurally more comparable to decisions from experience. There is evidence, however, that 
choices in repeated decisions from description can differ from choices where only a single choice 
is made (Barron & Erev, 2003; Keren & Wagenaar, 1987; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; Lopes, 
1981). To determine whether the first described choice was consistent with subsequent described 
choices, the data were re-analyzed using only the first choices that participants made for the gain 
and loss description decisions.  
 On the very first described gain trial, 42.4% of participants selected the risky option, 
whereas 56.7% of participants selected the risky option on the very first described loss trial, 
recapitulating the refection effect observed across all trials [McNemar’s χ2(1,N=238)=9.80, 
p<.01]. Choices on these first decisions were highly consistent with the mean risk preference in 
the last block of the decisions from description. On gain trials, participants who selected the 
risky option on the first decision were 22.7±9.3% more risk seeking in the last block 
[t(236)=4.82, p<.001, d=0.64]. On loss trials, participants who selected the risky option on the 
first decision were 25.9±9.4% more risk seeking in the last block [t(236)=5.44, p<.001, d=0.71]. 
In terms of the correspondence between decisions from description and experience, in the gain 
domain, participants who chose the risky option on their first description trial were 14.5±8.6% 
more risk seeking in the experience trials than those that chose the safe option [t(236)=3.32, 
p<.01, d=0.44]. This correspondence, however, was not statistically significant in the loss 
domain, where participants who chose the risky option on the first description decision were only 
4.3±8.4% more risk seeking in the corresponding experience trials [t(236)=1.01, p=.31, d=0.13].  
